

## “Debt Trap: Counter Models and Global Initiatives”

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### **ABSTRACT**

The practice of a creditor country or institution providing loans to a borrowing nation to increase the political leverage held by the creditor nation or establishment is referred to as "debt-trap diplomacy." This kind of diplomacy involves offering projects or loans to borrowing governments that have conditions that are too difficult for those states to pay back, with the end goal of compelling such states to make economic or political sacrifices. Simply explained, the debt trap is a situation in which an individual is obliged to overspend on loans to pay back their previous obligations. This position places the individual in a downward spiral of increasing levels of debt. Recently, one group has been pointing the finger at China, accusing it of using this technique to further its geopolitical goals in Asia and Africa by providing states in those regions with enormous loans and then purchasing the assets of the borrowing nations when those nations fail to return their debts. On the other hand, the opposite side has depicted China as a brilliant businessperson who saw an economic opportunity in the provision of loans to failed nations and who made great gains as a result, both monetarily and in terms of the resources acquired. This research paper aims at initiatives taken globally to counter the debt trap and their critical analysis. The paper also aims to provide solutions for the increasing debt trap crisis.

**Keywords:** Debt trap diplomacy, HIPC, MDRI, Great Stone model, Role of US and China. Etc.

### **INTRODUCTION**

As a consequence of power imbalances in international relations, poorer nations may be more susceptible to predatory loan practices and have less leverage to negotiate favorable conditions, making them more likely to fall into a debt trap. According to its detractors, debt traps may keep nations mired in poverty and impede their economic growth. When a nation incurs excessive debt to another nation or financial institution and finds itself unable to repay the obligation, the situation is known in international relations as a debt trap. This may happen when a government borrows money from overseas lenders to fund development projects or other requirements but then is unable to produce enough money to pay back the borrowed money.

The indebted nation may be obliged to take on even more debt to satisfy its repayment commitments, which may spiral into an even deeper debt hole and economic disaster. As a result of debt traps, a nation may be obliged to make policy concessions or accept other unfavorable conditions in exchange for more loans or debt forgiveness, reducing the country's economic and political independence.

Debt trap diplomacy is a phrase used to describe the use of external debt and loans for diplomatic purposes. The term "debt diplomacy" is the use of one nation's debt to affect the internal or foreign policies of another country, usually in a manner that is detrimental to the

borrowed country. Lending to a nation on unfavorable or unsustainable conditions, such as excessive interest rates or unrealistic repayment timelines, may be an example of debt-trap diplomacy. Borrowing countries' policies and behavior might be influenced by the possibility of default or debt forgiveness. Because it may erode the economic and political independence of borrowing nations and prolong cycles of poverty and underdevelopment, debt trap diplomacy is generally considered a contentious and exploitative practice. Human rights and international organizations have condemned it as exploitative and immoral.<sup>1</sup>

## **REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

For the following paper, the qualitative method of research has been used as it is based on secondary data sources, official reports, etc. The Doctrinal form of research is done in the paper. The formal literature sources used are IMF official reports on HIPC and MDRI debt relief initiatives. Apart from the formal news resources from the Global Times have been used to assert the cause of the debt trap and the role of the West in a debt trap. Kiryl Rudy's book "Global Trade in the emerging business environment" has been used for an extensive study of the Great Stone model of Belarus which it used to tackle the debt trap from China. "Financial Innovations and Monetary Reform: How to Get Out of the Debt Trap by Jean Francis Serval" (2023) is a book used to suggest ways to tackle debt traps and some generic methods for the same. The speech by Mr. Constantinos Herodotou, Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, at the YPO - Cyprus Chapter event, Nicosia, has also been analyzed to know methods to tackle the debt trap. *After this study, the research question was a critical analysis of these debt trap measures and whether are they making a difference or not. Also, the Belarus Model case study is a significant research objective to provide self-help options to other countries in similar shoes.*

## **CAUSES OF DEBT TRAP ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL**

Once again, protracted internal and foreign issues are among the primary reasons why low-income nations have such high levels of debt. Nevertheless, the present predicament is not at all comparable to other instances of debt crises. To be more specific, the creditors who are engaged have, for the most part, provided non-concessional loans rather than concessional loans. The ineffective management of the nation's debt, along with low government revenues brought on by ineffective tax policies and gaps in the rule of law, is one of the internal reasons. In addition, the loans are often used for the purchase of consumer items rather than for investments in productive enterprises. In addition, there are shocks from the outside environment, such as a decline in the pricing of commodities after 2011 or natural catastrophes such as floods or storms. Because of structural flaws in their economies, such as an insufficiently diversified economic and export structure, these countries' economies are very susceptible to price and demand shifts on the global market.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Kooteeti, [thekootneeti.in/2022/09/15/what-is-debt-trap-in-international-relations/](https://thekootneeti.in/2022/09/15/what-is-debt-trap-in-international-relations/). Accessed 6 June 2023.

<sup>2</sup> Katherin Berensmann, *Idos-Research.de*, 2019, [www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/why-developing-countries-are-facing-a-renewed-debt-crisis-1/](https://www.idos-research.de/en/the-current-column/article/why-developing-countries-are-facing-a-renewed-debt-crisis-1/). Accessed 6 June 2023.

The "debt trap" problem that certain developing nations have is the fault of Western countries. Some nations in Latin America's emerging economies fell into stagflation as a result of loans made by the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s, institutions controlled by the West. Bond yields continued to fall after the 2008 financial crisis thanks to policies like quantitative easing, and governments began actively paving the way for less developed countries to issue sovereign bonds in the international capital market, giving rise to the "Frontier Markets" of high-risk and high reward. Some less developed nations have borrowed excessively due to the favorable circumstances for issuing bonds, leading to a fast increase in the debt levels of emerging countries. In 2020, Zambia will be the first African state to default on its debt. It's \$3 billion in outstanding Eurobonds on the foreign capital market are the major source of debt strain. The main cause of today's debt troubles is the West's premature entrance of developing nations into the international financial market and connivance with their wanton borrowing. China's sovereign loans are made available to stimulate regional growth.<sup>3</sup> China's aid to Africa and other developing nations takes the form of interest-free loans, preferential loans, and export buyer's credits with favorable terms. Western aid to developing countries has increasingly relied on financial aid to promote political and economic system reforms in recipient countries since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, developing countries have been encouraged to use the international capital market to seek financing for the massive infrastructure projects they desperately need to complete, laying the groundwork for a debt crisis. Most poor nations have become more influential in international discourse as a result of China's increasing foreign assistance in recent years. The "China-created debt trap argument" is only the Western response to the continued reality of their intervention failure.

## **MEASURES FOR DEBT TRAP TACKLING**

### **A) HIPC (HIGHLY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES)**

In 1996, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank created the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative to alleviate the burden of debt on developing nations. In 2005, the HIPC Initiative was joined by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative to hasten the achievement of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. As a result, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the African Development Fund will forgive any remaining debts owed by HIPC Initiative nations. Additional debt relief ("beyond HIPC") was granted to the five HIPCs in the Western Hemisphere by the Inter-American Development Bank in 2007.

The international community agrees to reduce a country's debt to a level that is regarded sustainable once a formal decision is made by the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank on the country's eligibility for debt relief. The time has come for you to make a choice, so to speak. A nation may qualify for urgent temporary debt relief if it reaches this point. For a nation to qualify for a complete debt reduction under the HIPC Initiative, it must meet the following conditions:

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<sup>3</sup> Global Times, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202302/1285820.shtml>, Accessed 6 June 2023.

1. Create a record of continued strong performance under programs funded by loans from the IMF and the World Bank.
2. Put into action the crucial changes decided upon at the juncture.
3. Put into effect for a minimum of a year the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) that it has adopted.

If a nation satisfies all of these conditions, it has achieved the completion point and is eligible for the entire debt reduction promised at the decision point. Complete debt relief from the IMF and other creditors has been granted to 36 of the 39 HIPC Initiative-qualified or potentially eligible nations.

Reducing debt obligations is one strategy for helping low-income nations get the resources they need to develop. Debt relief can help alleviate poverty, but only if the extra funds are used towards initiatives that directly help those living in poverty. Eligible nations spent somewhat more on debt servicing than health and education before the HIPC Initiative. Health, education, and other social services have now surpassed debt servicing costs by a factor of nearly five since the initiative's inception.

Bilateral contributions and IMF resources, mostly investment income on profits from off-market gold sales in 1999 deposited to the IMF's PRGT-HIPC Trust, cover the IMF's portion of the cost.

Although Somalia and Sudan have fulfilled the basic prerequisites for debt relief and reached the decision stage, the trust's resources have not been adequate to support debt relief for these two nations. The expense of providing debt relief to nations with long-standing arrears to the IMF was not included in the initial funding plan. So, lack of resources remains a big problem. Further strategic goals of world powers also divert debt trap reliefs from countries of interest.

Ensuring that qualifying nations get complete debt relief from all of their creditors is one of the challenges facing the HIPC Initiative. The World Bank, African Development Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank, and all Paris Club nations, who are the main creditors to poor countries, have all contributed fully to debt reduction under the HIPC Initiative and beyond, while other creditors have not. Since participation in the HIPC Initiative is entirely optional, the IMF and the World Bank will keep urging creditors to do so to provide their fair share of debt reduction under the initiative.<sup>4</sup>

The HIPC Initiative is an improvement over previous attempts to reduce debt loads in developing nations. It achieves this by offering considerable debt relief to nations that qualify as beneficiaries and by actively attempting to include all creditors. However, the effort is unlikely to offer recipient nations a permanent departure from their debt troubles unless significant, persistent economic development is accomplished.

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<sup>4</sup> International Monetary Fund, [www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2023/Debt-relief-under-the-heavily-indebted-poor-countries-initiative-HIPC](http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2023/Debt-relief-under-the-heavily-indebted-poor-countries-initiative-HIPC). Accessed 9 June 2023.

Furthermore, the conflict between rapid debt relief and comprehensive country-owned measures is likely to exist so long as the program ties debt relief to poverty reduction methods. However, these concerns should not be used as an excuse to stop working to reduce the debt of qualifying nations.

Participants and onlookers alike need to be more realistic about the initiative's potential outcomes if the world's most heavily indebted developing nations are ever to see any respite from their crushing debt loads.<sup>5</sup>

### **B) MDRI (Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative)**

Thirty-five nations have already attained the HIPC Initiative's completion milestone, and another ten will soon join them. Chad is the only nation still in a transitional period. Recipient countries' debt loads were significantly reduced because of the Initiatives' debt relief, freeing up two and a half percentage points of GDP for use in fighting poverty between 2001 and 2013. Strong engagement from multilateral and Paris Club creditors in the Initiatives has been achieved; however, participation from other creditor groupings still has to be enhanced. Costs to the four multilateral creditors providing relief under the MDRI are projected at US\$41.1 billion in end-2013 present value terms, while the overall cost to creditors under the HIPC Initiative is estimated at US\$75.0 billion.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2005. Complete cancellation of claims by the IMF, the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, and the African Development Fund on countries that have reached or will reach the completion point under the enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries is the central proposal of this initiative, which was first proposed by the G-8 in June 2005. (HIPC Initiative). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations are focused on halving poverty by the year 2015, and debt relief under the MDRI is meant to assist eligible nations in moving towards these goals.

To qualify for the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), a country must have reached the HIPC Initiative's point of completion. Additionally, the IMF Executive Board agreed that all member countries (including non-HIPCs) with a per capita income of US\$380 or less should be eligible to meet the requirement unique to the IMF that the institution's resources be used fairly across its membership. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff examined these nations' eligibility for MDRI assistance in December 2005. Performance in macroeconomic policy, poverty reduction, and public spending management were used to make this evaluation, as required by the Executive Board. Except for Mauritania, on January 6, 2006, all eligible countries got complete debt relief of US\$3.3 billion. THE IMF GRANTED approximately US\$3.4 billion in debt relief to the first batch of 19 qualified nations. SDR 3.5 billion (about US\$5 billion; values are in end-2005 NPV terms) is the overall expected cost of the MDRI for

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<sup>5</sup> “Developing Countries: Challenges Confronting Debt Relief and IMF Lending to Poor Countries.” *Govinfo.gov*, 2023, [www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-745T/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-745T.htm](http://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-745T/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-745T.htm). Accessed 9 June 2023.

the IMF, excluding prospective HIPC nations subject to the sunset clause and the extended arrears cases. Therefore, the final price will be determined by the date and list of qualifying nations.

Countries that had previously attained the HIPC Initiative completion point and showed evidence of good policymaking and governance were eligible for debt reduction under the MDRI. Eligible nations were evaluated by two fundamental principles: conditionality for debt relief under the MDRI should be similar among members, and conditionality should not exceed that of the HIPC Initiative, as the G-8 originally envisioned.

These two concepts, when combined, showed that a HIPC nation that had previously attained its completion point would be eligible for MDRI relief provided its performance in three important categories had not materially worsened since the completion point. These included (i) overall economic health, (ii) efforts to alleviate poverty, and (iii) methods for controlling public funds.

Reducing debt owed to the IMF via the MDRI is meant to help the IMF better assist its low-income members. The International Monetary Fund is dedicated and well-equipped to continue advising and aiding members in the formulation of macroeconomic stabilization policies and structural reforms, in addition to capacity development and emergency finance. The IMF's primary tool to aid low-income countries in need of Fund funding is still the PRGF. The Policy Support Instrument (PSI) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility are two new tools created by the IMF to better meet the demands of its members. (ESF).<sup>6</sup>

### **IS DEBT RELIEF ACTUALLY MAKING A DIFFERENCE?**

The World Bank, the IMF, and the African Development Bank (AfDB) will conduct the next significant phase of debt relief for developing nations in 2006. The G8 first adopted the strategy in June 2005; since then, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) has been endorsed by the boards of international financial institutions. Africa's debt issues are mostly caused by the continent's weak economic and export development and the negative impacts of the global assistance system. Countries took out loans with very lenient conditions, yet they could still not pay them back since their investments never yielded the anticipated returns. As a result, Africa's debt levels are rising. The way donors, and the multilateral in particular, distribute loans has contributed to Africa's debt load. The majority of the bilateral donors have switched from providing loans to grants, leaving the World Bank and the AfDB as many African nations' primary sources of financing. The section of the World Bank that decides on new lending is not the same part that is concerned with debt levels. Thus, the process may be helped by the debt trap. Many of the participating nations were still grumbling about debt servicing requirements despite more generous debt relief programs and almost ten years of HIPC. The residual portion of the HIPC debt was mostly owing to the multilateral organizations since the bilateral debt was lowered via the Paris Club and the majority of bilateral creditors have now

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<sup>6</sup> MDRI Q&A, International Monetary Fund, [www.imf.org/external/np/exr/mdri/eng/mdrians.htm#q01](http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/mdri/eng/mdrians.htm#q01). Accessed 9 June 2023.

moved from loans to grants for the poorest nations. All of these tendencies contributed to a significant conceptual change: the main international financial institutions began to support the idea of working towards complete debt reduction. The final MDRI incorporates more resources "dollar for dollar" and is mostly based on the US plan. Some non-G8 members and World Bank employees had vehemently opposed the idea, arguing that it may endanger the Bank's long-term financial stability since there was no assurance that shareholders would make up any lost income. Near-complete debt relief for some of the world's poorest nations has been made feasible by the MDRI, a feat that debt advocates may have considered unthinkable just a few years ago. What, therefore, do we anticipate this success to do to the formerly indebted countries?

By contrasting the scale of debt payment with investment in areas like education and healthcare, activist groups like Jubilee and Oxfam provide a rationale for their calls for debt relief. That money is a fundamental constraining limitation on increasing welfare, that the quantity of debt service is large enough to have a substantial influence on those outcomes, and that nations are loath to spend money servicing debt that might be used for social services all add up to the thesis that debt service is a major source of unhappiness. If these things hold, then a virtually complete reduction in debt will result in massive increases in expenditure on social services, which in turn will have an immediate and beneficial effect on poverty rates and other developmental indices. All three hypotheses suffer from flaws, unfortunately. Debt forgiveness may cause an increase in expenditure on social services, as this has happened in the past. Second, the correlation between money spent and progress made is quite poor. Spending more on health care or education does not inevitably result in improved health or more students enrolled in those fields. The average amount spent on education does not correlate with school enrollment, and the same holds for healthcare spending and infant death rates. There is a substantial body of scholarship delving into this seeming contradiction, with most data pointing towards issues more systemic than budget levels, such as ineffective administration, subpar services, and even a lack of demand in certain circumstances. The third issue is that the MDRI uses a modest amount of resources. HIPCs have been vocal about how difficult it is to pay back World Bank loans, but the actual amount paid back has been negligible. In 2004, HIPC countries in Africa paid IDA an average of \$19 million to settle their debt. New IDA credits averaged \$197 million that year, and they got \$946 million in total assistance. To rephrase, they only had to pay back a fraction of the fresh money they got from the World Bank and only a tenth of the total help they received. Unmanageable debt is a symptom of ineffective leadership and policymaking. All of the HIPCs are, in fact, in the middle of significant economic reform initiatives. However, the existence of large debt and debt servicing commitments may generate policy constraints that undermine some of those very changes by distorting policy dynamics, such as promoting an unduly short-term focus or diminishing public support for reforms. If recipient nations' reform efforts have been stymied by their debt loads, the virtually complete debt forgiveness achievable under the MDRI might be a welcome boon. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that previous debt relief has resulted in measurable policy changes, again indicating that the short-term benefit is likely to be limited.

A few heavily indebted low-income nations will see substantial reductions in their debt stock thanks to the new MDRI. Neither the HIPC nor the MDRI would have been approved without the emotive appeals to poverty reduction made by anti-debt advocates. The public and politicians have certainly been swayed by the political effectiveness of contrasting debt payments with social services and high levels of need in underdeveloped nations. While the impacted nations may feel some short-term financial damage, it is very doubtful that this will have a significant influence on government budgets or poverty reduction. Simply put, the sample sizes are too tiny, and the cost is usually not the limiting factor. Because the debt load was never as terrible as campaigners regularly claimed, and because the pathways through which debt impacts development are different than popularly assumed, debt reduction is not expected to have a major effect. It's not that the MDRI is a bad plan, but rather that its effects, if any, will be subtle and hard to gauge for quite some time. Therefore, it is prudent to maintain realistic and expansive time horizons about the impact on heavily indebted nations and development indices.<sup>7</sup>

### **THE CASE OF BELARUS AND CHINESE DEBT TRAP TACKLING**

The project itself (such as the building of a power plant, a road, or a factory) is of main relevance rather than being the source of its funding since the "debt trap" is associated with project loans. China does not initially give a loan but instead engages in a project-building tender with a loan. Belarus received its first loans connected to China in 2005. The construction of three cement plants, the installation of steam-gas units at the regional electric power plants in Bereza and Lukoml, the reconstruction of a portion of the M5 highway, the electrification of the railways, the purchase of locomotives, the launch of a national satellite, and other projects were all preceded by the establishment of the BeST mobile operator. From one in 2007 to five in 2011, Belarus saw a rise in the number of projects supported by loans related to China. As a result, the total amount of connected loans started to increase. The sample size generated \$417.9 million in 2011, \$488.5 million in 2012, \$1.1 billion in 2013, and \$699 million in 2014. Belarus was required to pay back past Chinese loans in the new period. Due to issues with cement sales, Belarusian cement facilities that had been upgraded with Chinese financing were unable to repay their loans on their own; as a consequence, the Belarusian Government took over their debts. The Dobrush Paper Mill likewise had issues repaying a Chinese loan, so the government offered assistance. As a consequence, the amount of debt that the Belarusian state had guaranteed for China was increasing, and repayment from Belarus's budget was required. In this context, Belarusian state agencies started debating the need to leave the road that

would otherwise lead the nation into a "debt trap" as well as the need to enhance the project financing model. It was suggested to do this in four ways:

1. abandoning tied loans as part of managing state debt;

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<sup>7</sup> Todd Moss, Will Debt Relief Make a Difference, Working Paper Number 88, CGD, (9-14), 2006. Accessed 9 June 2023.



2. abandoning tied loans as part of reducing imports;
3. Abandoning tied loans in favor of untargeted credits; and
4. abandoning credit cooperation in favor of direct investment liaisons.

A prohibition on borrowing from China was not anticipated when moving away from tied loans. It was believed that there would be fewer new investment projects funded by linked Chinese loans and that borrowing conditions would improve, moving away from commercial terms to preferential terms, from government guarantees to non-guaranteed guarantees, and from related to unrelated.

### **THE GREAT STONE MODEL**

The "Great Stone" industrial park has emerged as Belarus' primary "magnet" for luring Chinese direct investments in the modern period. The Industrial Park was developed by a joint corporation, and when the infrastructure was put in place, the first occupants and direct investors were from China. As a consequence, FDI from China to the Republic of Belarus totalled \$164.5 million in 2014 and \$77.7 million in 2015. The land of the Industrial Park was still being developed in 2016, and more Chinese inhabitants were recorded in 2018. In 2018, there was a change in the yearly influx of Chinese direct investments, reaching a historical high of \$190 million. In terms of net statistics, their investments almost tripled to \$112 m. Chinese direct investment decreased significantly in 2019 to \$141 million, including \$107 million on a net basis, as a result of certain significant projects by Chinese investors being completed in the Industrial Park and elsewhere, such as Belkali-Migao.

Because of this, from 2016 to 2019, Belarus got \$545 million, or 53% of all Chinese direct investments that came to the nation from 2007 to 2019, totalling \$1.25 billion. China was third in net FDI and sixth overall in terms of FDI to Belarus.<sup>8</sup>

The key question for the 'Great Stone's' success is who will be the primary source of the management abilities, technologies, and global values that will be developed in the industrial park's Belarusian personnel. To reduce the debt load, the Sino-Belarus industrial park "Great Stone" is intended to be a significant player in the bilateral transition from loan to direct investment cooperation. The establishment of "Great Stone"—which takes the Singapore-China Industrial Park as its model—is intended to lower the burdensome national taxation, get around bureaucratic obstacles, reduce government meddling in business affairs, and generally transform Belarus's socialist-style economy into a more traditional market-oriented one. By building a university in the park, which is focused on new technologies, the chance to become a high-tech center may be realized. The 'Great Stone's' investment potential is limited by the size of the Russian and Belarusian markets for sales. The difficulty of high yearly state debt repayment during 2021–2025 cannot be overcome at the rate at which Chinese direct investments are now being made in the industrial park known as "Great Stone." Therefore,

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<sup>8</sup> Kiryl Rudy "Belarus China: Avoiding the Debt Trap" Global Trade in the Emerging Business Environment, Chapter 4, Intechopen, 2022. Accessed 9 June 2023.

steps must be made, such as the establishment of a free trade agreement between China and "Great Stone," to entice American and European businesses to establish manufacturing facilities in the "Park" to export to China.

### **SOME GENERIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEBT TACKLING**

The first step in avoiding the debt trap is to encourage cautious lending. To do this, we may establish guidelines to guarantee that only financially stable nations are awarded loans. The money must be put to good use, rather than frittered away on pet projects. When deciding whether or not to lend money, creditors should consider the debtor country's economic situation. One of the most effective methods to avoid falling into the debt trap is to seek debt relief. The debts of the debtor country are reduced or eliminated. Creditor countries or international financial organizations may forgive debts, or debts may be restructured via negotiations with borrowers. As a result, the debt-ridden nation's economy and society may be relieved of some of its financial strain.

The debt trap may be avoided in part by enhancing the ability of debtor countries to handle their debts responsibly. Providing debt management, budgeting, and financial planning training and technical support is one way to achieve this goal. This will help the debtor countries evaluate the pros and cons of borrowing and implement long-term solutions for debt management.

Debtor countries may escape the "debt trap" by broadening their economic base. This entails diversifying economic activity away from an overreliance on any one product or industry, such as farming, manufacturing, or service provision. This will aid in the creation of employment, the enhancement of productivity, and the generation of money, all of which can be used towards paying down debt and investing in economic and social growth.

Enhancing regional collaboration is another technique that may help avoid falling into the debt trap. Specifically, this means coordinating with neighboring nations to boost trade, investment, and economic cohesion. This has the potential to boost competitiveness, expand the available market, and entice investors. Bolstering local economies may also lessen the likelihood of debt default. Finally, making the loan and borrowing process more transparent may assist in avoiding falling into the debt trap. This requires better monitoring and reporting of debt and more transparency about loan information. As a result, the likelihood of corruption will decrease and the likelihood of excessive borrowing and debt build-up will rise.

### **CONCLUSION**

The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi famously observed, "History has shown us that under the guise of development partnerships, countries were coerced into dependency alliances." It paved the way for imperial and colonial power. It spawned new pillars of international authority. China was more willing to forgive debt in this African nation than in other areas of the globe. The reason behind this is that unlike South Asia and other regions of the globe, Africa does not provide Beijing any immediate geostrategic benefit. Beijing will not

pass up any opportunity to increase its presence, influence, and leverage in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific area. Those nations in the Horn of Africa, Eastern Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia where China has taken a hard stance on loans surround India and the Indian Ocean. China claims this is a coincidence, but India should be wary of China's actions there since they might be used as a springboard for a future invasion. Now, I'll wrap up. Private and governmental debt are both necessary for economic development because they provide funds for investment and spending, two of the most important drivers of expansion. However, a country's growth rate suffers when public and private debt levels are both very high. The effect is usually magnified as debt increases, and it might even threaten financial stability. New vulnerabilities, such as the pandemic crisis and the war in Ukraine, have increased the risks of rising private and public debt even though international and national regulatory bodies have made significant efforts in recent years to implement a more strong and strategic financial architecture and to strengthen financial system regulation and oversight. However, crises provide chances to revise policy and solve underlying problems. In the face of today's interlocking problems, policymakers have a chance to adopt all the essential changes to create the groundwork for a more stable and prosperous future.

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